Does freedom of religion include the freedom to leave Islam?

Lina Joy and the identity card

Lina Joy had been baptized as a Christian, but her Malaysian identity card still identified her as Muslim. When she asked to have the word “Islam” removed, the registration department wanted confirmation from a Syariah court. In 2007, Malaysia’s Federal Court upheld that requirement by a two-to-one majority. The dissenting judge thought the department had exceeded its authority. Joy knew what faith she professed. The dispute was over who could give that change official recognition. Lina Joy, Federal Court judgment · Record of baptism

Under international human-rights standards, the answer to the title question is yes. A person may become Muslim, leave Islam for another faith, or cease to believe in any religion. Within Islamic jurisprudence, the answer has been more contested. Most classical jurists accepted punishment for an established act of apostasy, known in Arabic as ridda. Muslim scholars today disagree about whether that rule applies to a peaceful change of belief, to a betrayal of the community, or at all. Universal Declaration, art. 18 · UN Human Rights Committee, para. 5 · Razi H. Quadir, survey of the sources

What does the Qur’an say about leaving?

Qur’an 2:256 begins, “Let there be no compulsion in religion.” The rest of the verse affirms the truth of faith in God. A reader can accept both ideas at once. The question is how far the ban on compulsion reaches. Does it forbid forcing someone to enter Islam, or does it also forbid forcing someone to stay? Qur’an 2:256

Two passages speak more directly about leaving. Qur’an 2:217 warns of the spiritual loss facing someone who abandons the faith and dies in unbelief. Qur’an 4:137 describes people who believe, disbelieve, believe again, and disbelieve again. Neither passage instructs a court to punish them. For scholars who oppose a penalty, the repeated changes in 4:137 pose a plain question. How could someone return to faith a second time if the community had a duty to execute them the first time? Traditional jurists answer that the Qur’an’s account of divine judgment leaves room for the Prophet to give a separate legal ruling. Qur’an 2:217 · Qur’an 4:137 · Razi H. Quadir, survey of the sources

A more difficult passage, Qur’an 4:89, authorizes fighting people described as turning away. The next verse makes an important distinction. If they withdraw, refrain from fighting and offer peace, the believers have no grounds to act against them. Reading the verses together raises a question that recurs throughout the debate. What conduct, beyond disbelief, is at issue? Qur’an 4:89 · Qur’an 4:90

Why the hadith matter

A hadith is a transmitted report about the Prophet Muhammad’s words or conduct. In Sahih al-Bukhari 6922, Ibn Abbas attributes to Muhammad a command to put to death someone who changes religion. A second report, in Sahih Muslim 1676a, describes the person in question as someone who leaves the faith and separates from the community. Both collections carry particular authority in Sunni Islam. The difference in wording matters. Does leaving Islam itself count as separation from the community? Or must the person also do something that betrays it? Al-Bukhari 6922 · Muslim 1676a

Early accounts give each reading something to explain. After Muhammad’s death, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, fought groups who refused to pay zakat, the obligatory alms. That episode helps explain why later scholars saw a political dimension in apostasy. Yet another report in al-Bukhari describes a man in Yemen who had embraced Islam and returned to Judaism. It recounts his execution without identifying an armed revolt or a separate act of treason. A war over allegiance and the case of an individual convert cannot simply be treated as the same event. Al-Bukhari 1399–1400 · Al-Bukhari 6923

Where the classical jurists drew the line

The four major Sunni schools generally regarded a legally established, voluntary renunciation by a competent adult Muslim man as a capital offence. The eighth-century jurist Malik ibn Anas gives a concrete example. A person who openly professed a change of religion should be invited to return. In Malik’s account, someone who persisted faced execution. He did not require separate proof that the person had attacked the community. His rule concerned a departure that others could establish. A private doubt is a different matter. Malik, Muwatta, book 36, report 15 · Razi H. Quadir, survey of the sources · Abdurragmaan Khan, legal opinion

The schools differed over procedure and whom the penalty covered. Hanafi jurists generally prescribed imprisonment for a woman who left Islam, while the Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanbali schools generally applied the capital rule to women as well. Classical Twelver Shi‘i law also distinguished a man born into Islam from one who converted and later left. Repentance could avert execution for the latter, while the traditional rule for the former was harsher. The rules show what jurists authorized. Establishing how often any society enforced them requires separate historical evidence. Razi H. Quadir, survey of the sources · Kadivar, pp. 135–136

Four answers Muslims give today

The classical rule still binds. Shaykh Abdurragmaan Khan reads Qur’an 2:256 as protecting people against forced entry into Islam. In his view, the hadith govern what happens after someone leaves. He reserves judgment to a lawful ruler or court. A relative or neighbour has no authority to punish anyone. For those who hold this view, accepting the Prophet’s legal authority means taking even a difficult ruling seriously. Abdurragmaan Khan, legal opinion

Public advocacy changes the case. Yusuf al-Qaradawi distinguished a person who quietly leaves from one who publicizes the break and urges others to follow. He reserved the death penalty for what he called major apostasy and allowed lesser sanctions in the other category. For him, a campaign against the faith could threaten the community. A former Muslim might ask where that leaves someone who publishes a peaceful account of why they left, especially when Muslims themselves claim the freedom to explain why others should join. Study of al-Qaradawi, section 4.5

A penalty requires treason. In a 2013 opinion, Egypt’s Dar al-Ifta linked the penalty to high treason and held that changing one’s religious convictions alone does not trigger it. Its reasoning rests on the hadith’s reference to separating from the community. The distinction matters in practice. A person can change religions and remain loyal to the same neighbours and country. If an authority alleges betrayal, what act can it identify beyond the change of faith? Dar al-Ifta, opinion 6592

Belief is answerable to God. The Shi‘i scholar Mohsen Kadivar argues that a report authorizing death for apostasy conflicts with the Qur’an’s protection of conscience and should be rejected. He regards faith as something a person must freely embrace. His position leaves room for a believer to consider the departure a grave spiritual error while denying any human authority the power to punish it. Mohsen Kadivar, his argument

Who gets to name a person’s faith?

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights expressly protects changing one’s religion. The UN Human Rights Committee has explained that the freedom also covers adopting atheistic views or retaining one’s existing belief. In Canada, freedom of conscience and religion protects a Muslim who wishes to practise and a former Muslim who wishes to live openly with another faith or none. Universal Declaration, art. 18 · UN Human Rights Committee, para. 5 · Justice Canada, Charter section 2(a)

Consider what freedom of religion asks of a family. A Muslim parent may hope a daughter returns to Islam. An imam may explain why he believes she should. She may hear them both and still say, honestly, that she is Christian. Freedom of religion has practical meaning when each of those people can speak the truth as they understand it, and the daughter can act on her answer.